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In previous  years  the  NBER Macroeconomics  Annual has  included  two 
types  of papers: those  that introduce  and develop  recent frontier contri- 
butions,  and those  directed at policy or applied  problems.  It is one mark 
of  the  welcome  shift  of  emphasis  in  macroeconomics  in  recent  years 
toward dealing  with real-world  problems  that most of this year's papers 
fit into both  categories. 
The opening  paper,  "A Tale of Two  Cities: Factor Accumulation  and 
Technical Change  in Hong  Kong  and  Singapore"  is by Alwyn  Young. 
The phenomenal  growth  performance  of these  two  economies  is of di- 
rect  interest  and  can  also  be  used  to  examine  how  well  the  growth 
models  developed  in  an explosion  of  output  in the  last 5 years  fit the 
facts. 
At  first glance,  the  economic  stories  of  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore 
appear very  similar.  Both have  been  growing  at high  rates,  for nearly 
four decades  in Hong  Kong  and  for close  to three  in Singapore.  Both 
have gone  through  a similar sequence  of products,  moving  from textiles 
early on to electronics,  and  more recently  to banking. 
However,  these  similarities are less impressive  than one extraordinary 
difference.  A decomposition  of growth  into the contributions  caused by 
labor,  capital,  and  technological  progress  reveals  two  fundamentally 
different processes  of accumulation  and growth.  Growth in Hong  Kong 
has  come  largely  from  technological  progress:  The  rate of  investment 
has  been  stable  at a moderate  20% of gross  domestic  product  (GDP), 
and  technological  progress  accounts  for 59% of the  growth  of  output 
per worker over the last 20 years. In sharp contrast, growth in Singapore 
appears  to  have  come  entirely  from  capital  accumulation  and  capital 
deepening.  Investment  rates have  been  high  and  increasing,  standing 2  BLANCHARD  & FISCHER 
in 1985 at 40% of GDP. And Young's  estimates  imply  that all of growth 
in output  per worker has been  due to capital accumulation.  Put another 
way,  he concludes  that there has been  no technological  progress  at the 
aggregate  level  in Singapore  over the last 20 years. 
Having  documented  these  facts,  Young  seeks  to explain  them.  The 
explanation,  he  suggests,  is  that  Singapore  has  grown  too  fast for its 
own good,  moving  into new  products before having  the expertise,  mov- 
ing out of old products  before having  fully exploited  learning by doing. 
He  paints  a  picture  of  Hong  Kong  as  an  economy  with  a  hands-off 
government,  where  growth  has been  driven by domestic  entrepreneurs 
employing  a skilled  labor force  and  moving  to  the  next  product  only 
when  the  time  was  right.  In contrast,  he  argues,  growth  in Singapore 
has come  from a heavy-handed  industrial  policy,  in which  the govern- 
ment  has  moved  too  fast from product  to product,  and  has  relied  too 
much on foreign investment  and entrepreneurs,  and too little on domes- 
tic talent. 
The  portrait he  paints  of  Singapore  is  of  an  economy  with  foreign 
firms coming  in  to take advantage  of generous  tax breaks,  later going 
out  and  taking  with  them  their  capital  and  their  expertise.  Thus,  he 
argues,  growth  has not triggered  the development  of domestic  learning 
by  doing  and  has  not  led  to  the  development  of  a class  of  domestic 
entrepreneurs.  Rates of return on capital are low,  and Singapore  cannot 
expect to grow  at high  rates for much  longer. 
By relating the theoretical discussions  of the role of increasing returns, 
externalities and learning in the growth literature to the real-world expe- 
rience in these  two  countries,  the  paper  makes  an important  contribu- 
tion.  As  Young  and  his  discussants  both  emphasize,  the  facts  go 
strongly against a popular class of models  of endogenous  growth,  those 
with  increasing  returns  to  capital  accumulation.  If those  models  were 
true, Singapore  would  show  high,  not low,  technological  progress.  The 
facts point  instead  to the key roles of learning  and of entrepreneurship 
in growth.  The analysis  obviously  leaves  a number  of questions  open. 
For example,  should  one  conclude  from the  Singaporean  example  that 
industrial policy  is a terrible idea,  or only  that industrialization  should 
have  proceeded  at a slower  pace? Should  one  also  conclude  from the 
Singaporean  example  that  foreign  investment  is  to be  avoided,  or in- 
stead that it should  be coupled  with domestic  content requirement,  with 
requirements  on  the  employment  of  domestic  managers?  Should  one 
conclude  that the  hands-off  policy  of the  Hong  Kong government  was 
the  secret of growth  in Hong  Kong,  or that more infrastructure would 
have  led to an even  more impressive  performance? These  are old ques- 
tions  in development;  as this paper  shows,  these  are the questions  on 
which  new  growth  theory  must  now  focus. Editorial 3 
Growth experience  in Latin America and Africa in the 1980s was dom- 
inated  by  the  international  debt  crisis.  After  the  shift  from  the  new- 
financing  Baker strategy  to the  debt-reduction  Brady Plan in 1989, and 
with  East European  news  crowding  the  debt  out  of the  headlines,  the 
question  is whether  the debt crisis is on its way  to a solution,  or rather 
has  simply  become  less  fashionable.  For some  countries,  most  notably 
Chile and Mexico,  the  debt crisis is clearly on its way  to solution.  That 
is not the case  for most  African countries. 
In his  paper,  "The  Debt  Crisis: A  Postmortem,"  Daniel  Cohen  ad- 
dresses  three  main  questions.  First,  how  did  the  creditors fare during 
the debt crisis of the 1980s? Cohen  answers  that they have done  reason- 
ably  well.  He  calculates  the  present  value  of  aggregate  payments  by 
the debtors,  including  the liquidation  value  of the remaining  debt,  and 
finds  in  several  cases  that  the  countries  have  successfully  paid  off 
at  a  rate  higher  than  LIBOR.  Even  the  20  or  so  severely  indebted 
countries  as a group  would  have  repaid 77% of their 1982 indebtedness 
if  the  creditors  had  sold  the  remaining  outstanding  debt  at  its  1989 
market value. 
These high servicing  rates during a period of real economic  difficulties 
lead Cohen  to ask why  the debtors  serviced  their debt to the extent they 
did.  His answer  is that they  feared the cutoff of trade credit. He devel- 
ops  a  simple  model  of  the  consequences  of  being  cut  off  from  trade 
credit and  shows  that this  financial  autarky imposes  high  costs  on  the 
borrowing  country. 
The  second  major question  is  whether  the  Brady Plan  is,  as  many 
have  suggested,  a scheme  for bailing  the  banks  out  at the  expense  of 
the international  financial institutions,  and ultimately  at the expense  of 
governments  and  taxpayers.  Cohen  starts  by  showing  that  for  most 
countries,  a debt  consolidation  carried out  at the  marginal rather than 
average  price of debt would  have brought  relatively  little change  in the 
market value  of  the  debt  while  allowing  a significant  reduction  in  its 
face value.  This means  that debt  reduction  is unlikely  to have  cost  the 
commercial  banks  a great  deal.  Evaluating  the  Mexican  deal,  he  con- 
cludes,  as have  others,  that the deal was  mainly a transfer from the IFIs 
to the country,  with  the banks  gaining  very  little. 
The third issue  is the impact of the debt crisis on growth  in the debtor 
countries.  Cohen  estimates  that large  debtor  countries  suffered  an ex- 
cess  (relative to other  countries)  decline  in growth  of 1.9% per annum 
in the 1980s. He  attributes 0.8% (per annum)  to the worsening  of their 
terms  of  trade,  and  0.2% to  a decline  in  investment.  If one  assumes 
these  latter  sources  of  decline  are  not  caused  by  the  debt  crisis,  the 
residual  that Cohen  attributes  to indebtedness  is a decline  of 0.9% per 
annum.  This is sizeable,  even  though  it accounts  for only  about a third 4  BLANCHARD  & FISCHER 
of  the  excess  decline  and  a fifth  of  the  total  decline  in  growth  in  the 
indebted  countries  in the  1980s. 
Cohen  concludes  his  paper  by  asking  how  large  an  impact  foreign 
capital inflows  should  be expected  to have  on growth,  a question  given 
added  interest  by Eastern Europe's  hopes  of attracting foreign  capital. 
He concludes  that domestic  saving  and particularly domestic  accumula- 
tion  of  human  capital  are far more  important  determinants  of  growth 
than foreign  capital,  but that foreign  inflows  are likely to be most  pro- 
ductive  in  countries  that  are  relatively  rich  in  human  capital  and  in 
countries  integrating  into a larger economy-conditions  that apply  rea- 
sonably  well  in Eastern Europe. 
The paper by John Cochrane  and Lars Hansen,  "Asset  Pricing Explo- 
rations for Macroeconomics,"  presents  a unified  description  of work on 
asset pricing conducted  within  the framework  of models  of intertempo- 
ral optimization  by  households,  and  also  by  firms.  They  address  two 
related but  not  identical  empirical  issues:  the  equity premium puzzle, of 
why  the  return  on  the  stock  market has  on  average  exceeded  the  real 
return on Treasury bills by more than 500 basis points;  and the risk-free 
rate puzzle, of why  the real riskless  rate is so low. 
These  are puzzles  in the sense  that the standard model  of frictionless 
asset  markets populated  by intertemporal  optimizing  households  is not 
consistent  with  the  rates of return and  variances  of rates of return ob- 
served  in U.S.  capital markets.  While both Hansen  and Cochrane  have 
played  prominent  roles  in  developing  the  econometrics  and  theory  of 
the standard approach  to asset  pricing,  the present  paper is less  techni- 
cal,  relying  heavily  on  a powerful  graphical  technique,  which  can  be 
understood  from Figure 1. 
Using  this  technique,  Cochrane  and  Hansen  show  in  Figure  1 that 
implausibly  high  degrees  of risk aversion  would  be needed  to account 
for the  equity  premium.  And  if risk aversion  were  at these  levels,  the 
riskless  real rate of  return  would  be  extremely  high,  as  much  as  17% 
per quarter. In the remainder of the paper, Cochrane and Hansen  exam- 
ine  the  power  of  many  different  explanations  that have  been  put  for- 
ward to account  for the  puzzles. 
Among  the  explanations  they  examine  is  whether  lengthening  the 
investment  horizon  can whittle  down  the  puzzle.  Because  many  indi- 
viduals  hold  stocks  over  longer  horizons  than  a quarter,  perhaps  pe- 
riods longer  than a quarter are relevant  to determining  their basic asset 
holding  decisions  and  the  implied  pricing  of  assets.  Regrettably,  the 
lengthening  of  the  investment  horizon  seems  only  to  accentuate  the 
puzzles.  Nor do they get any further in accounting  for the puzzle  when 
they  take account  of the (limited) predictability  of asset returns (Fig. 5). Editorial  5 
Models  of habit persistence  in consumption,  nonexpected  utility  theo- 
ries of intertemporal  choice,  and production-based  models  of intertem- 
poral discount  rates are discussed  next. While habit persistence  can help 
account for the risk-free rate puzzle,  Cochrane and Hansen  do not focus 
on this  set of explanations. 
Rather, they give more emphasis  to the role of borrowing  constraints, 
paying  particular attention  to asset pricing in markets where  some  indi- 
viduals  are  credit  constrained,  and  others  satisfy  the  unconstrained 
conditions  for intertemporal  utility maximization.  They  also discuss  al- 
ternative forms of constraint: one in which  individuals  are not permitted 
to  hold  portfolios  whose  initial  values  are  negative,  and  another  in 
which  they are not allowed  to take positions  that allow their final portfo- 
lio  values  to  be  negative.  They  show  that  borrowing  constraints  can 
deal with  the risk-free rate problem but do not-at  least in the versions 
of  the  equilibrium  pricing  model  they  present-solve  the  equity  pre- 
mium  puzzle. 
By the  end  of  the  Cochrane-Hansen  paper,  the  reader will  be  con- 
vinced  of the power  and elegance  of the analytic and graphical approach 
used  in the paper,  and will probably be more frustrated than he or she 
was  initially by the difficulty  of accounting  for the long-standing  puzzle 
of  the  equity  premium.  Whether  alternative  approaches  that  do  not 
derive  so closely  from models  of individual  optimization  can do better 
remains  to be seen.  But whatever  new  approaches  are developed,  they 
will have  to meet  the  same  rigorous  standards  of explanation  as Coch- 
rane and Hansen  demand  of the models  they  present  in their paper. 
Economists  have  organized  their  thoughts  about  monetary  policy 
around  two  basic  models-and  their abundant  progeny-,  the  model 
developed  by  William  Poole  to think  about  the  choice  of instruments, 
and  the  model  developed  by  Finn  Kydland  and  Edward  Prescott  to 
think about the choice  between  rules and discretion.  While policymak- 
ers and  central bankers  have  listened  politely,  their policies  look  quite 
different from anything  these  models  suggest.  Central banks frequently 
set  many  targets,  frequently  miss  target  ranges,  and  not  infrequently 
change  targets altogether.  Instead  of giving  yet more advice,  the paper 
by Ben Bernanke  and  Frederic Mishkin  looks  at central bank behavior, 
on the reasonable  idea that we,  academic economists,  may thereby learn 
something  about  what  central bank  concerns  are and  about  why  they 
do what  they  do. 
Bernanke and Mishkin first present  a detailed  description  of monetary 
policy  since the breakup of the Bretton Woods  system  for six countries: 
the  United  States,  the  United  Kingdom,  Canada,  Germany,  Switzer- 
land,  and Japan. Their purpose  is to show  what  the various  monetary 6  BLANCHARD  & FISCHER 
"strategies"  have been, and how and why those have changed through 
time. In reading their description, one is struck  by the variety of strate- 
gies both through space and through time. One counts no less than 
six different targets, MO  to M3, nonborrowed reserves, "central  bank 
money," used at one time or another by one of those countries. And 
changes are frequent. The move by Germany  from targeting MO  to tar- 
geting M3 nearly coincides with a move by the United Kingdom from 
targeting M3 to targeting MO,  and so on. 
They then suggest  a number of hypotheses  to make sense  of the 
apparent complexity. A first key to understanding the behavior of cen- 
tral banks, they argue, is that, while central  banks have many ultimate 
goals, at any point in time they focus on one or two. In other words, 
they have a crisis mentality. A second key is that, when inflation be- 
comes the main issue, as in the late 1970s in most of these countries, 
central banks give renewed emphasis to money growth targets. This 
signals to markets the central  bank's commitment to fight inflation. But 
even then, they feel compelled neither to meet target ranges nor to stick 
to the same targets. 
Having offered a description of central  bank behavior, Bernanke  and 
Mishkin take some  risks and offer tentative hypotheses  as to what 
seems to work and not work. First, they argue, money targets work 
best when they are most transparent,  i.e., constructed  according  to sim- 
ple rules. They suggest that such transparency  may be what has allowed 
the Swiss Central  Bank  to rebase its target ranges in response to perma- 
nent  shifts in velocity without losing  credibility. They point to  the 
United Kingdom in the late 1970s  as a bad case of the opposite. Second, 
maintaining  credibility  does not require short run adherence to money 
targets;  they point again to Switzerland  and Germany. Third, they sug- 
gest that the choice of instruments does not in the short run seem to 
affect the general performance of monetary policy. Switzerland is an 
example where the use of the monetary  base as the instrument  is associ- 
ated with short-term,  but not long-term, interest variability,  and to Ger- 
many, where the use of an interbank rate as the instrument has been 
associated with very low money growth variability. 
Bernanke  and Mishkin insist that their paper is aimed at developing 
hypotheses rather than reaching firm conclusions. We think that both 
the  positive  and  normative models  of  monetary policy  they  have 
sketched in their paper will indeed lead to more formal, quantitative, 
work, and move the debate on "rules versus discretion" closer to the 
concerns of central bankers. 
Another ambitious and wide-ranging description of  the  economic 
landscape is given by Steven Davis, who in "Cross-Country  Patterns  of Editorial 7 
Change  in Relative Wages"  looks  at the evolution  of relative wages  for 
nine  advanced  economies  and four middle-income  economies  over the 
past 20 years. 
The  motivation  for  the  paper  comes  from  the  dramatic  increase  in 
wage  inequality  in the United  States since the early 1980s. For example, 
from 1979 to  1987, the  wages  of young  male  college  graduates  relative 
to young  males  with  12 years  of schooling  increased  by over 30%. The 
facts are now  well  established,  and  research  is moving  to  narrow  the 
range  of explanations.  In this  respect,  it is  clear that looking  at many 
countries,  advanced  and developing,  can be of great help. 
Because  of data constraints,  Davis limits his examination  for the most 
part to  the  wages  of  full-time  male  workers.  He  looks  first at  simple 
measures  of wage  inequality,  such as standard deviations  of log wages, 
or the differential between  wages  in the 90th and 10th percentiles  of the 
wage  distribution.  He  finds  that  the  1980s have  indeed  been  times  of 
increased  wage  inequality  in all advanced  countries.  By contrast,  wage 
differentials  have  declined  in Brazil, Venezuela,  Colombia,  and  South 
Korea, the four middle-income  countries  he includes  in his  study.  The 
commonality  within  each of the two groups  is difficult to reconcile with 
the dominance  of labor supply  shifts,  which  are largely country specific. 
The difference  between  the two  groups  on the other hand is suggestive 
of a reallocation of production  across the two groups  of countries.  Davis 
clearly prefers  the latter hypothesis,  which  he tests  later in the paper. 
Before  doing  so,  Davis  looks  at wage  differentials  as  a function  of 
experience  and education.  He first shows  that the returns to experience 
have  increased  in all nine  advanced  countries  in the  1980s, and  some- 
times  earlier. For the countries  for which  he can control both for educa- 
tion and age,  his conclusion  is that returns to experience  have increased 
across  education  levels.  Again,  things  are  quite  different  in  middle- 
income  countries;  there the returns to experience  have  remained  either 
constant  or decreased.  The picture of the evolution  of returns to educa- 
tion  is  only  a  bit  more  blurry.  They  have  increased  strongly  in  the 
United  States,  less  so  in other  advanced  countries.  And  they  have  de- 
creased  sharply  in the  four middle-income  countries.  Thus,  when  one 
looks at the evolution  of wage  differentials by experience  and education, 
the picture is again largely one  of commonality  within  each group,  and 
differences  between  the  two  groups. 
Davis  then  focuses  on the role of international  trade in the evolution 
of  these  wage  differentials.  Increased  specialization  of  countries  can 
easily  explain  why  wages  of  unskilled  workers  have  stagnated  com- 
pared to those  of skilled  workers  in advanced  economies,  and why  the 
reverse  has  happened  in  developing  countries.  A  first pass,  in  which 8 ?  BLANCHARD  & FISCHER 
Davis  looks  at whether  the  structure  of relative  wages  has  converged 
across  countries,  is not  encouraging:  relative  industry  wage  structures 
have diverged,  not converged,  since the early 1980s. Davis then sets up 
a more sophisticated  test,  in which  he looks  at the relation,  across time 
and countries,  between  the evolution  of openness,  measured  by exports 
plus  imports  and  the  deviation  of the  relative  wage  structure from the 
world average.  He finds that openness  is negatively  related to the devia- 
tion  of  the  wage  structure  from  the  average.  His  conclusion  is,  thus, 
that while  other factors have  been  at work,  the contribution  of interna- 
tional trade has been  to reduce  the  differences  between  national  wage 
structures. 
At the end of the paper, one cannot escape  the conclusion  that relative 
demand  rather than  relative  supply  shifts  account  for most  of  the  in- 
crease  in  wage  inequality  in  the  1980s in  the  United  States  and  other 
advanced  economies.  How  much  of it comes  from skill-biased  techno- 
logical  progress  versus  reallocation  of production  because  of increased 
trade remains  unclear.  Davis  convincingly  shows  that trade has played 
some  role.  How  much  trade may  widen  income  gaps  within  countries 
is a potentially  explosive  issue  that remains  largely  for future research 
to establish. 
But before you  go  out to do the research,  you  should  read this inter- 
esting  crop of papers.  Bon appetit! 
Olivier Jean Blanchard and Stanley Fischer 